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The Crisis of Intelligibility in Physics and 






1. G. H. von Wright and the crises of reason and 
intelligibility  
The Finnish philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright’s (1916-
2003) book Vetenskapen och förnuftet – ett försök till orientering 
(Science and reason – an attempt to orientation), first published 
in 1986, gave rise to an intense debate in both Finland and 
Sweden about the pros and cons of science and technology.  
The book was an expanded version of a paper “Images of 
science and forms of rationality” which he had delivered in 
Colmar in April 1985, at a European Science Foundation col-
loquium (von Wright 1989).  The book had two underlying 
motivations. One of these was von Wright’s aspiration to un-
derstand the basic features of the world-view that modern 
science provides us with.  Another was his desire to evaluate 
the effects that science has had upon our lives, through tech-
nology and the industrial form of production.  He describes 
this kind of exploration as follows:  
It is becoming increasingly obvious … that the transformations 
of life effected by science and technology are not exclusively 
beneficial. … These worries … have challenged reflective minds 
to question the impact of scientific technology on life, and 
therewith also the value of the type of rationality which science 
represents.” (von Wright 1989, 11). 
The adverse effects of science and technology are well known 
– they include pollution, overpopulation, alienation and 
stress, as well as the threat of nuclear war. Von Wright char-
acterizes the situation as a crisis of reason that, for one thing, 
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expresses itself in various anti-rationalist protests and an in-
creased interest in magic, the supernatural and various “wis-
dom doctrines” based on Eastern religion, sometimes relying 
on recent scientific advances.  Another aspect of the crisis is 
that intellectuals have felt the need to explore the nature of 
scientific rationality, which has resulted in a rational debate 
about rationality.  It could be the case that science and tech-
nology are neutral and that the problem is merely the way 
human beings use them.  But it might also be the case that 
there is something about the very nature of the prevailing 
scientific rationality which makes it especially prone to bring 
about the adverse effects of science and technology. 
Von Wright notes that a main contribution to this debate 
has been Adorno and Horkheimer’s notion of the “dialectics 
of the Enlightenment”, according to which the prevailing 
kind of rationality involves above all the use of means to 
achieve various ends. It is an instrumental, technical and 
goal-oriented rationality that enables a better efficiency in the 
production of goods and in the organization of services.  But 
such technical rationality is helpless when it comes to finding 
and articulating the values that legitimate the aims. (von 
Wright 1986, 17-18). 
Habermas proposed that there could be a different, com-
municative rationality that is based on language and our abil-
ity to exchange thoughts freely.  However, von Wright did 
not think that Habermas’s approach could tackle the inevita-
ble course of the “negative dialectic” of progress and enlight-
enment. Instead, he felt that we should explore the deep 
relationship that exists between the form of the scientific ra-
tionality of a given age and the nature of the scientific world-
view of that age.  But this requires that we understand the 
basic features of the relevant scientific world-views. Thus, a 
considerable part of Science and reason is dedicated to an at-
tempt to explicate the development of scientific word-views 
from ancient Greek science to the present time. 
Von Wright notes that during the transition from the Mid-
dle Ages to the Modern era great changes took place in our 
view of the structure of the universe and the laws that deter-
mine the course of natural processes.  A new world-view was 
born which during many centuries was to dominate people’s 
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view of the world and of their possibilities to carry out their 
lives.  He says that this world-view was based upon certain 
vague ideas about the comprehensibility or intelligibility of real-
ity.  Over the centuries, leading philosophers and scientists 
made an attempt to articulate these ideas in more exact terms. 
To put it in general terms, von Wright says that the world-
view that was being constructed was deterministic and mecha-
nistic. (Ibid, 9-10). 
He then points out that the foundations of this mechanis-
tic-deterministic world-view were shaken and partly deterio-
rated during the 20th century.  This process began with a 
crisis in the conceptual framework of physics that is still go-
ing on.  He calls this the crisis of intelligibility.  He adds that 
certain developments in biology (e.g. ethology, ecology and 
the theory of evolution) have contributed to the transfor-
mation.  The mechanistic patterns of thought have become 
less dominant and have given room for holistic ways of 
thinking. (Ibid, 10).  However, he notes that these new ways 
of thinking do not yet amount to a coherent, commonly ac-
cepted world-view, comparable to the old mechanistic-
deterministic one.  
Von Wright’s main concern is to try to understand how 
science, via technology, has influenced the living conditions 
of humanity.  He says that this can also been seen an attempt 
to understand one’s own time, adding that to understand the 
present involves tracking down and interpreting the tenden-
cies that point towards the future: 
It is about getting a grip on the question “Where are we heading 
for?” The idea is not to predict how the future turns out to be, 
but rather how it may turn out to be, if one projects the trends 
that are salient in the present. The trends can be broken and the 
very insight into them can become a force that contributes to the 
change.  (Ibid, 11-12). 
This underlines the potentially important role that philoso-
phy may have in society.  For von Wright philosophy is not 
merely an intellectual exercise that is irrelevant to the sur-
rounding world; on the contrary he implies that philosophical 
insight may awaken humanity to become better aware of po-
tential disasters it is heading towards, and even change its 
course. 
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Von Wright further notes that his attempts to orient him-
self in the present, with the future in view, have always 
searched for starting points in the past.  Not only has he been 
seeking in the past the source of the forces that are now driv-
ing the development, he has also tried to discover alternatives 
to our own form of life (as an example, he characterizes an-
cient Greek science as a “rational search for the reasonable”, 
in contrast to our present more technically oriented science).  
For him such an approach is justified primarily because it 
might help us to understand ourselves better. (Ibid, 12). 
Von Wright emphasizes that his work is an attempt toward 
orientation.  He understands those who might think that the 
attempt has failed. He himself has found “the world-view of 
science” to be fragmented and confused, and he does not 
want to take a stand on the question of whether the impact of 
technology upon our lives has been more negative than posi-
tive. He thinks that perhaps the best result that an attempt to 
orient oneself can give is a strengthened critical and skeptical 
attitude towards reality. (Ibid, 12-13). 
While von Wright is very cautious and somewhat pessi-
mistic regarding his “attempt”, he also saw some signs of 
hope.  We already saw above that he thought that an insight 
into present trends might contribute to changing them.   
But he also felt there was some reason for optimism in the 
holistic ways of thinking that have emerged in 20th century 
physics and biology: 
…it is interesting to note the similarity of trends in microphysics 
… and macrobiology … towards new ideals of scientific intelli-
gibility. … Would such a holistic world-view, if it were to 
emerge, represent a new form of rationality? Perhaps in the 
sense that it would have a less close tie to the goal-directed, 
managerial rationality of control and prediction. Its technical 
pay-off would presumably be smaller than that of science of Ba-
con and Descartes. But it may instead encourage a shift in the 
view of the man-nature relationship from an idea of domination 
to one of co-evolution – and this may be to the advantage of the 
adaptation of industrial society to the biological conditions of its 
survival. (von Wright 1989, 24). 
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I find von Wright’s attempt highly relevant today, as it is 
clear that humanity has not been able to solve the kinds of 
problems that he drew attention to.  The list of most salient 
problems may perhaps have changed somewhat in the thirty 
years since the publication of Science and reason, as we now 
worry about things like global warming, terrorism, the Syrian 
crisis, many other conflicts and the associated refugee prob-
lems, the new tension between Russia and the rest of Europe, 
and various economical crises.  Yet we seem to be quite help-
less regarding how to approach the root of such problems 
that often involve science and technology in subtle ways. Von 
Wright proposed that the prevailing goal-directed scientific 
rationality (and its underlying dualistic and mechanistic-
deterministic world view) is likely to be an important con-
tributing factor behind many of our problems.   At the same 
time he speculated that science itself might hold a key to their 
solution in the sense that certain new, more holistic develop-
ments in science may facilitate a transformation of scientific 
rationality into a more harmonious direction.  
In the light of the above it is understandable that a major 
part of Science and reason is a description of the development 
of the Western scientific world-view, focusing on those fea-
tures that are relevant to shaping the form of scientific ration-
ality.  In particular, von Wright brings out the main features 
of the mechanistic-deterministic world-view of the 16th and 
17th centuries, making clear how some of its features natural-
ly enable a goal-oriented, technical rationality. But he also 
shows how developments in quantum physics radically vio-
lated many of the basic principles of this world-view in the 
early 20th century, creating a crisis of intelligibility.  The key 
question for him is whether a more harmonious form of sci-
entific rationality could arise from the holistic new categories 
that seem to be required to make sense of the new develop-
ments in physics and biology. 
In this paper I will revisit von Wright’s discussion.  I will 
first summarize his overview of the mechanistic world-view 
(sections 2 and 3).  I will then describe – often in more detail 
than von Wright himself - the developments in quantum 
physics which challenged the mechanistic world-view (sec-
tion 4).  I will next consider, in the light of von Wright’s dis-
cussion, one of the key attempts to resolve the crisis of 
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intelligibility in physics, namely David Bohm’s “hidden vari-
able” or “ontological” interpretation of quantum theory” (sec-
tion 5).  Finally, I will briefly consider von Wright’s idea that 
a new form of scientific rationality and world-view, emerging 
from physics and biology, might help to meet the problems of 
our times. As an example of an attempt toward this direction 
I will mention Bohm’s work on communication and a new 
form of dialogue (section 6). 
 
2. The intelligibility of nature as the rational 
foundation of science 
As we mentioned above, von Wright proposed that there 
might something about the prevailing form of scientific ra-
tionality (and its underlying scientific world-view) that plays 
a role in bringing about the adverse effects of science and 
technology.  This led him to examine various forms of ration-
ality, such as the goal-directed use of reason involved in the 
early development of agriculture; the rational search for the 
reasonable in ancient Greek science; the “magical science” of 
Middle Ages Arabic culture that in its own way aimed to con-
trol and master the forces of nature; the dualistic, mechanis-
tic-deterministic and experimental rationality that arose in 
the scientific revolution of the 16th and 17th centuries; the 
technological and managerial means-ends rationality that 
became dominant with the industrial revolution; and finally, 
the new kind of holistic rationality that might arise if we 
manage to make sense of the new phenomena revealed in 
modern physics and biology.  One of von Wright’s central 
focuses in this discussion is intelligibility: 
The mental attitude underlying Greek science and speculation is 
a belief that the human mind is capable, on its own, of decipher-
ing the logos of things – just as the Renaissance pioneers of mod-
ern science were convinced that ‘the book of nature’ lay open to 
be read and understood by human beings. One could call this a 
belief in the intelligibility of the natural order of things. It is … 
the common rational foundation of anything which is properly 
called ‘science’, whether in the Greek or in the Western sense. 
(von Wright 1989, 12). 
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The above helps to understand why it was so shocking to the 
entire scientific enterprise when physics encountered the 
mysterious relativistic and quantum phenomena in the early 
20th century. For if von Wright is correct, such a crisis of intel-
ligibility in fundamental physics shook the very rational 
foundations of science as this has been traditionally under-
stood. 
To bring out the nature of intelligibility characteristic of 
Western science, von Wright discusses in some detail the sci-
entific revolution of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centu-
ries, which amounted to a creation of a new world-picture. 
This was based on the breakthrough of heliocentric astrono-
my, great advances in mathematics and the acquisition of an 
entirely new conceptual framework for mechanics (von 
Wright 1986, 15).  He is particularly concerned with the un-
derlying methodology and the new demands of intelligibility of 
the new science, and with this concern in mind presents some 
basic features of this new way of thinking, which we will 
briefly report in the following. 
The first of these has to with a new view of the relationship be-
tween human beings and nature that can also be called a new 
conception of nature.  The basic idea is that nature is object and 
a human being is subject. A human being faces nature partly 
as a detached observer and partly as a manipulator.  Von 
Wright characterizes this as a dualistic conception of reality, 
with roots not only in Descartes and some of his contempo-
raries but also in a long tradition before them. For one thing, 
the objectification of nature led to a sharp distinction between 
facts and values. Unlike with the ancient Greek science, it was 
no longer thought to be possible to find values through stud-
ying the order of nature. (Ibid, 45). 
Von Wright notes that a common feature of both ancient 
and modern science is the conception of nature as lawful order.  
In the course of the scientific revolution this conception be-
came strictly deterministic and mechanistic. Determinism here 
amounted to a belief that everything that happens has a cause 
in something that has happened earlier and can be predicted 
if one knows the law according to which the cause operates.  
To say that this determinism is mechanistic means that all 
natural processes can in the end be reduced to the motion of 
bodies. This mechanistic determinism gave rise to the prob-
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lem of freedom and determinism: if all movements of the 
body are governed by the laws of nature, how then could the 
individual with her free will actively interfere in the course of 
physical processes? Connected to the Cartesian conception of 
reality there is, of course, also the general mind-body prob-
lem concerning how the body and the mind are related to 
each other. (ibid, 46-7). 
Von Wright moves on to discuss another significant fea-
ture of the way of thinking advocated by the new science, 
namely the relation of a whole to its parts.  The basic idea in 
this regard is that material bodies and natural processes can 
be analysed or divided into elementary component parts, 
whose properties and manner of influence determine the 
whole.  The whole can be grasped on the basis of the parts, 
but the reverse does not hold, i.e. one cannot grasp the parts 
on the basis of the whole.  The wholes that can be understood 
in this way are called meristic or mereological.  A meristic 
view of the relation between the whole and the parts is also 
called atomistic. The division into component parts is analy-
sis, while the construction of the whole from the parts is syn-
thesis. (Ibid, 48). 
Von Wright notes that the new mathematical physics came 
to be the paradigmatic example of a mechanistic-
deterministic and atomistic-meristic science.  This example 
has been an important normative factor for the development 
of not only the natural sciences but also the social sciences 
and humanities, such as Comte’s sociology and the classical 
associationist psychology. (Ibid, 49). He also notes that the 
opposite of a meristic methodology is a holistic one.  To 
adopt a holistic view of a whole (a system, a totality) is to 
grasp the properties and way of functioning of the parts in 
terms of laws that apply to the whole. The whole, as it were, 
is prior to the parts. It is interesting to note here that some 
contemporary social scientists, such as Alexander Wendt 
(2015), are today making use of the holistic features of quan-
tum theory as they are trying to develop a more holistic 
framework for the social sciences. 
The third main feature of the rationality of the new science 
was the role of experiment in the endeavor of trying to un-
derstand nature.  This required that one adopt a manipulative 
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approach to nature. The object of study is isolated from the 
environment and one tries to control and vary the factors that 
are assumed to influence the outcome of the experiment.  The 
idea is that experiments ought to be repeatable and that one 
can predict and control the results of one’s intervention.  Such 
manipulative approach was foreign to ancient Greek science 
where one typically respected and studied the natural course 
of events (ibid, 50-1). 
 
3. Intelligibility vs. mathematical precision in classical 
physics  
Von Wright notes that already early on it became doubtful 
whether the new physics of Galileo et al. could satisfy all cri-
teria of intelligibility that are demanded by the very nature of 
scientific rationality (von Wright 1986, 88). According to him 
the most passionate effort toward clarity and concrete com-
prehensibility in the history of scientific literature is Des-
cartes’ Principia philosophiae (1644); von Wright sees it as a 
most remarkable attempt toward an explanation of nature.  
He notes that in his search for intelligibility Descartes was led 
to speculate how things might happen in levels and contexts 
that in his time were beyond experimentation and observa-
tion.  Descartes made no use of the mathematical models he 
himself had developed; his system did not make predictions 
that could have been tested; and it gave rise to no technical 
applications.  Von Wright then notes with great insight that 
Descartes’s “failure” raises the question of whether mathe-
matical precision in the description of nature can be fully rec-
onciled with reasonable demands of rational 
comprehensibility.  (Ibid, 88-9). As we will see later, this 
question becomes particularly relevant in the context of quan-
tum theory, where we have a mathematics that allows for 
prediction and control, but where it has traditionally been 
seen as very difficult, if not impossible, to provide an intelli-
gible physical description of physical processes.  For example, 
some physicists have tried to explain quantum processes in 
terms of a sub-quantum fluid, which can be seen as attempt 
to satisfy Cartesian criteria of intelligibility in quantum theo-
ry.  In recent years this kind of approach has received new 
attention via Couder’s “bouncing droplet” model, a classical 
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system that can in a truly fascinating way reproduce some 
quantum behavior (Couder and Fort 2006).  However, it is 
important to bear in mind that this model has serious limita-
tions and cannot reproduce some important quantum phe-
nomena such as non-locality and aspects of many-body 
behavior. 
Let us return to consider the problems of intelligibility in 
classical physics. Most notably, Descartes could only com-
prehend an influence that is transmitted via a material medi-
um: there must be a direct contact between things that 
influence each other. Newton’s law of gravitation was not 
consistent with this requirement, as it postulated action at a 
distance. Von Wright points out that such an influence would 
have been totally incomprehensible for Descartes – a relapse 
into an intellectual “Middle Ages barbarism” that Descartes 
thought he had eliminated (Ibid, 89).  
We might note here that the Newtonian action at a dis-
tance was, however, not a big problem for the consistency of 
classical physics.  When action at a distance - or non-locality - 
reappears in quantum theory in the 1930s things are different, 
however.  This is because the special theory of relativity holds 
that signals cannot be transmitted faster than the speed of 
light.  While it is usually thought that one cannot send signals 
via non-local quantum influences, there is nevertheless a se-
rious tension between relativity and quantum non-locality 
(for an interesting recent attempt to reconcile the problem, 
see Walleczek and Grössing 2016).  We will discuss quantum 
non-locality in more detail below.  
Another difficulty for thought had to do with the two rival 
theories about the nature of light that arose in the late 17th 
century.  According to Newton light was made of particles 
while Huyghens proposed that light was a form of wave mo-
tion in a medium that was called the lumineferous ether. In 
the early 19th century the experiments by Young and Fresnel 
demonstrated that light had wave properties such as diffrac-
tion and interference, and thus Huyghens’ theory was 
thought to have won.  However, the ether hypothesis in its 
classical form was strongly challenged by the Michelson-
Morley experiment in the later 19th century.  Von Wright 
notes that with the failure of the ether hypothesis the ideals of 
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comprehensibility of the new science had entered into a dan-
ger zone. The classical era of physics was coming toward its 
end and physics was at the edge of something essentially 
new.  A crisis of intelligibility was soon to erupt. The transi-
tion to a new era was marked by what von Wright considers 
to be two of the greatest achievements in the history of sci-
ence: the birth of the theory of relativity and quantum theory. 
(Ibid, 90-1). 
 
4. Quantum theory and the crisis of intelligibility  
Let us focus on quantum theory (here we will go into some 
more detail than von Wright in his review in Science and rea-
son). We noted above that it had been established by Young’s 
interference experiments that light has a wave nature.  How-
ever, to explain the photoelectric effect (in which light trans-
mits energy to matter) Einstein was led to postulate in 1905 
that light consists of small particle-like packets or quanta of 
energy, photons.  This did not, however, mean that the wave 
nature of light that had been experimentally detected was 
given up.  On the contrary, the energy of a “particle” of light 
was given by Einstein’s famous equation E = hf, where h is 
Planck’s constant and f is the frequency of the light.  Thus, the 
energy of a particle of light depends on the frequency of the 
wave aspect of the same light.  Light thus has both wave and 
particle properties, and this somewhat paradoxical feature is 
called wave-particle duality.  For something to be both a par-
ticle and a wave at a same time is thought to be paradoxical, 
because traditionally in physics wave and particle were 
thought to be mutually exclusive categories: a wave is typi-
cally spread out in space, while a particle is localized. Some-
thing is either a wave or a particle, but not both.   
In the meantime Niels Bohr was working on the atomic 
structure of matter and came up with a model where the at-
om was visualized as a miniature solar system, where elec-
trons go around a nucleus, somewhat like the planets go 
around the sun.  To explain the atomic spectra (the discrete 
frequencies of light emitted by a gas of, say, hydrogen), Bohr 
postulated that only certain discrete energy levels were pos-
sible for the electrons, and also that there was a lowest level, 
thus explaining the stability of matter.  The electron could 
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then make discrete “quantum jumps” from one allowed en-
ergy level to another.  When it moved from a state of higher 
to a lower energy, it emitted one quantum of light with a fre-
quency E = hf.  And in order to jump to a higher level of en-
ergy it needed to absorb a quantum of a suitable energy.  
However, Bohr was not able to explain why the discrete ener-
gy levels and the lowest level existed; he just postulated them 
in order for the model to predict the observed results. 
An important further step in the development of quantum 
theory was taken by Louis de Broglie, who was inspired by 
the notion of symmetry in his research.  If electromagnetic 
radiation (such as light) has both wave and particle proper-
ties, could it be the case that matter, too, exhibits these two 
properties? Thus, de Broglie postulated in 1924 boldly that a 
material particle such as an electron is associated with a wave 
property.  Such a wave-property of electrons was soon de-
tected in Davisson and Germer’s experiment in 1927, where 
they observed wave-like interference patterns produced by 
electrons.  De Broglie’s idea could also be used to better ex-
plain some puzzling features of Bohr’s early atomic model. It 
was known already in classical physics that waves in enclo-
sures vibrate in discrete frequencies (e.g. the harmonic over-
tones of a vibrating guitar string). If an electron has a wave 
associated with it, and if such an electron wave is “enclosed” 
within an atom, then it would be natural for it to vibrate with 
discrete frequencies, giving rise to the observed discrete en-
ergy levels for the electron (if we also assume that the Ein-
stein equation E = hf holds for electron waves).  
Von Wright raises the question of whether the apparently 
mutually exclusive wave and particle pictures of matter and 
energy imply that there is a contradiction in the conceptual 
structure of physics.  He notes that the question has not yet 
been answered, but refers to Bohr’s notion of complementari-
ty as an attempt to reconcile the wave and particle pictures.  
Notice that when we say that two pictures are “complemen-
tary” in Bohr’s sense, this cannot be understood in the sense 
of two parts of a single picture.  Rather, we have here two 
incompatible pictures that, however, both give information 
about the object.  Bohr (1949) says that “…only the totality of 
the phenomena exhausts the possible information about the 
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objects”.  But this totality includes mutually exclusive phe-
nomena.  Bohr’s notion of complementarity is thus very sub-
tle, involving the necessity to combine incompatible 
viewpoints. Arkady Plotnitsky (2010, xvi) provides a succinct 
summary of this difficult concept (see also Pylkkänen 2015): 
…complementarity is defined by (a) a mutual exclusivity of cer-
tain phenomena, entities, or conceptions; and yet (b) the possi-
bility of applying each one of them separately at any given 
point; and (c) the necessity of using all of them at different mo-
ments for a comprehensive account of the totality of phenomena 
that we must consider. 
Von Wright notes that Bohr’s approach implies a radical vio-
lation of the criteria of intelligibility of classical physics: 
…the so-called Copenhagen Interpretation … is in substance an 
acknowledgement of the fact that a self-consistent and complete 
theory of the microworld which satisfies the requirement of 
classical physics simply cannot be provided. (von Wright 1989, 
21). 
Von Wright then moves on to discuss Heisenberg’s uncertain-
ty principle, according to which it is not possible to measure 
accurately both the momentum and the position of a particle 
at the same time.  This is so because the observation disturbs 
the system in a certain way (we might add here that this is 
Heisenberg’s early idea; Bohr had a more subtle view of the 
situation, see Plotnitsky 2010).  The more precisely one 
measures the momentum, the more indeterminate becomes 
the position and vice versa. Von Wright (1986, 95) notes that 
it is not clear how one ought to interpret the situation:  “Is it 
just a question of a limit to our possibilities to know where a 
microparticle is located and how fast it moves – or is it so that 
an electron in fact has no well-defined position and velocity?”  
Regardless of how we answer this question, it is clear that we 
can no longer assume that the observed object is independent 
of observing subject (or her measuring apparatus) in the same 
way as in classical physics.  Von Wright also notes that Hei-
senberg’s uncertainty principle calls into question traditional 
views about causality in nature.  Could it be the case that 
natural processes, instead of being strictly determined by 
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laws of nature, are rather governed by probabilities, which 
allow for exceptions? (Ibid, 96). 
Von Wright acknowledges that while it is possible that 
people will gradually get intellectually used to the idea com-
plementarity, it feels for the time being unsatisfactory to the 
demands of thought. He notes that inspired by Einstein there 
have been attempts to develop “hidden variable” theories in 
quantum mechanics. The aim of this endeavour is to obtain a 
more unified theory of the microworld than the Copenhagen 
interpretation has provided, yet not necessarily a determinis-
tic theory in the classical sense (Ibid, 97-8).  We might men-
tion here as an example that David Bohm’s hidden variable 
approach  (which we will discuss in more detail in a later sec-
tion) includes both deterministic (Bohm 1952; Bohm and 
Hiley 1987) and stochastic (Bohm and Vigier 1954; Bohm and 
Hiley 1989) versions; see also Nelson (1966). 
Von Wright next considers the thought experiment of Ein-
stein, Podolsky and Rosen (EPR) that they presented in 1935.  
We shall here describe the experiment in some more detail 
than von Wright does.  Bohr had said that because of the limi-
tations described by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle it is 
meaningless to talk about an electron as if this had simulta-
neously a well-defined momentum and position.  However, 
quantum mechanics implies that there are situations where 
two systems that interact with each other can become entan-
gled.  EPR pointed out if two such entangled systems are 
separated from each other, their properties remain correlated 
in such a way that by measuring the position of a particle A 
one can obtain information about the position of particle B, 
and the same for momentum – and according to them this 
happens “without in any way directly influencing B”.  But 
surely, argued EPR, the particle B must have both a well-
defined position and a well-defined momentum already prior 
to measurement, if an experimenter can choose which one of 
these she wants to measure (i.e., an experimenter can choose 
to measure either the position or the momentum of particle 
A, and in this way (without disturbing B) get information 
about either the position or the momentum of particle B; sure-
ly particle B must have these properties well-defined, waiting 
to be revealed). 
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Bohr’s reply to EPR emphasizes the new feature of quan-
tum wholeness and complementarity.  To measure the posi-
tion requires a certain form of the experimental-set up, which 
is incompatible with the set-up required to measure the mo-
mentum.  Bohr implied that when we change the experi-
mental set-up there is an “…influence on the very conditions 
which define the possible types of prediction regarding the 
future behavior of the system” (Bohr 1935, 700).  Thus when 
we choose to measure the position of A, we need an experi-
mental set-up which influences the conditions which define 
our predictions concerning B; in this set-up only predictions 
concerning the position of B are meaningful.  And the situa-
tion is analogous for a momentum measurement.  So Bohr 
was implying that when deciding which property of A we 
measure, we are influencing the properties of B in the sense 
that our experimental set-up for A determines what we can 
find out from B.  However, Bohr’s reply was very cryptic, and 
the nature of the influence upon B was left quite vague. 
However, when we examine the EPR situation more realis-
tically (as von Wright does in his short description) we en-
counter a difficulty somewhat similar to the difficulty with 
the notion of action at a distance in Newton’s theory of gravi-
tation. For it seems that with entangled quantum systems, 
experimental interventions at subsystem A appear to influ-
ence subsystem B instantaneously, without any mediating 
local contact between them. This challenges traditional no-
tions of cause of effect, insofar as one assumes that signals 
cannot be transmitted from one location to another faster 
than the speed of light (which latter would violate the theory 
of relativity). Von Wright then writes: 
An imaginative and interesting attempt to resolve the difficulty 
has been made by the American-English physicist David Bohm.  
Bohm’s idea is that the microphysical system in question is a 
whole (his term is “unbroken wholeness”) in which the relation-
ship of the parts to each other is determined by overarching 
laws in such a way that a change in one location (immediately) 
“corresponds” to a change at another location, according to the 
demands of order within the system.  The idea blatantly contra-
dicts the meristic postulate of Cartesian intelligibility. The rela-
tionship of the parts must by understood on the basis of an 
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ordering principle for the whole.  Such a way of thinking is holis-
tic. (von Wright 1986, 99). 
Bohm’s proposal is an example of the kind of holistic think-
ing that von Wright sees characteristic of the attempts to de-
velop a world-view that can deal with quantum and 
relativistic phenomena.  We also mentioned above that von 
Wright thought that a new form of rationality might emerge 
from such thinking.  Let us thus, in the next section, examine 
in more detail Bohm’s attempts to make sense of quantum 
theory. 
 
5. David Bohm and the search of an intelligible 
explanation of quantum phenomena  
We have already above seen examples of Bohm’s work that 
are relevant to the question about the crisis of intelligibility in 
physics.  For one thing, Bohm was one of the main propo-
nents of a “hidden variable” theory that attempted to go be-
yond the limits set by the Copenhagen interpretation. But 
since the 1960s he was also working toward a more general 
way of describing relativistic and quantum phenomena, 
which he characterizes as a “new order” for physics, namely 
the “implicate order” (Bohm 1980; this is the notion that von 
Wright’s refers to in the above quote where he mentions 
Bohm’s explanation of the EPR experiment).  We will here 
focus on Bohm’s (1952) “hidden variable” approach, which 
later developed into an “ontological interpretation” of quan-
tum theory (Bohm and Hiley 1993; see also Goldstein 2013).  
This approach is particularly relevant to von Wright’s discus-
sion that we have reported above, because Bohm was – at 
least initially – trying to explain quantum phenomena in 
many ways according to classical demands of intelligibility. 
However, it turns out that the Bohm theory – especially un-
der its later formulation due to Bohm and Hiley - goes radi-
cally beyond the mechanistic materialism of classical physics.  
This gives us one way of understanding how quantum phe-
nomena call for new criteria of intelligibility. We may even be 
able to get a glimpse of a new form of rationality, something 
that von Wright speculated might arise if we manage to make 
sense of the new physics. 
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Bohm encountered the crisis of intelligibility in quantum 
theory early on in his career.  Richard Feynman (1965) fa-
mously said “I think I can safely say no-one understands 
quantum mechanics”, and this was probably a fairly common 
sentiment among ordinary physicists in the 1940s, regardless 
of Bohr’s “Copenhagen interpretation”.  Bohm was particu-
larly troubled by this situation.  He felt that the teaching of 
quantum theory typically involved a one-sided emphasis on 
mathematics.  Not enough attention was given to the physical 
meaning of the theory, and to how the need for the theory 
arose from certain problems in classical physics. I recall Bohm 
telling me in discussion that he was so frustrated by the pre-
vailing attitude in physics in the 1940s that he considered giv-
ing it up and doing something else (discussion between 
Bohm and PP, Joensuu, Finland, August 1987). Unable to find 
a meaningful alternative for himself he however decided to 
stay in physics and write a textbook on quantum theory that 
would try to remedy the situation as much possible. His book 
Quantum theory came out in 1951, and is considered to be one 
of the best textbooks of its time, and is still a valuable re-
source (Bohm 1951).  The book contains a number of new ide-
as that try to make sense of quantum phenomena in physical 
and philosophical terms, along with a detailed mathematical 
exposition. There was even a discussion of analogies between 
quantum processes and thought (see Pylkkänen 2014). 
When Bohm had finished his textbook he was still not sat-
isfied.  Something was missing: quantum theory did not pro-
vide a coherent ontology.  These feelings became stronger 
when Einstein, having read Bohm’s book, contacted him and 
wanted to discuss with him (both of them were in Princeton 
at the time).  The discussions with Einstein convinced Bohm 
of the need to look for a realistic and causal extension of 
quantum theory. 
Bohm’s search was successful.  He considered a certain 
approximation (WKB) that is used to discuss the transition 
from quantum theory to classical theory.  From the philo-
sophical point of view, by making the approximation one 
slips from “no well-defined ontology” (quantum theory) to 
the well-defined ontology of classical physics (i.e. particles 
moving along trajectories under the influence of potentials).  
It is as if an ontology suddenly appears from a mysterious 
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“non-ontology, if one just approximates away, or removes 
something from this quantum “non-ontology”.  Bohm then 
asked himself what would happen if one did not make the 
approximation, and saw that there was actually a new kind of 
well-defined ontology hiding in the Schrödinger equation 
when this latter was rewritten in another form.   The term 
that one usually approximated away could now be seen as a 
new kind of “quantum potential” which has the dimensions 
of energy and which acts on the electron, besides other poten-
tials such as the electromagnetic. Bohm had independently 
rediscovered a model that de Broglie had presented in the 
1927 Solvay conference, but had soon abandoned due to criti-
cisms. Bohm was able to answer some of these criticisms and 
in this way gave a new life to this approach. (Bohm 1987). 
Bohm’s theory is extremely important for von Wright’s 
discussion of the crisis of intelligibility in modern physics.  
For it appears at first sight that the theory restores at least 
some aspects of classical intelligibility in quantum physics.  An 
electron is not ambiguously a particle OR a wave, but rather 
it is always a particle AND a wave.  Moreover, individual 
quantum processes (e.g. the motion of a quantum particle) 
can be understood as being causally determined, instead be-
ing inherently indeterministic as in the usual interpretation of 
quantum theory. At the same time Bohm’s theory also made 
the holistic features of quantum phenomena very explicit, 
and in this sense it differed radically for from the 
mereological character of classical physics. 
Let us briefly explore some features of Bohm’s model. The 
wave gives rise to a quantum potential that affects the parti-
cle over and above classical potentials. The quantum poten-
tial thus accounts for the difference between classical and 
quantum behavior.  For example, if one examines the famous 
two-slit experiment, Bohm’s theory makes the hypothesis that 
the particle goes through one of the slits while the associated 
quantum wave goes through both slits. After passing the slits 
the wave interferes with itself, which gives rise to a complex 
quantum potential that profoundly affects the behavior of the 
particle. The quantum potential “bunches” the possible parti-
cle trajectories in such a way that when a large number of 
particles are passed one by one through the system, we ob-
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serve an interference pattern emerging “spot by spot” at the 
screen.  This way we can explain or make intelligible what hap-
pens in the two-slit experiment. The electrons are particle-like 
because they move along trajectories and give rise to local-
ized spots; and they also exhibit wave-like behavior because 
they are affected by the quantum potential arising from the 
quantum wave.  
However, in typical circumstances at the large-sale level, 
the quantum potential has a negligible effect and classical 
physics provides a good approximation. The Bohm theory 
thus provides not only an explanation of quantum behavior 
(such as particle interference) but also a clear answer to the 
notorious problem of how the quantum and classical levels 
are related. This is in contrast to the Copenhagen interpreta-
tion that on the one hand presupposes the classical level, 
while on the other hand it also admits that in some sense the 
classical level consists of quantum objects (see Bohm 1951, 
ch23). 
 Have we thus been able to transcend the limits of the Co-
penhagen interpretation? Unfortunately, the restoration of 
intelligibility in the Bohm theory does not come without a 
price.  While the theory is logically consistent, there are some 
puzzling features. For one thing, the theory is non-local. This 
is perhaps the main reason why Einstein did not accept it.  
However, it was precisely the non-locality of the Bohm theo-
ry which made John Bell to ask more general questions about 
hidden variable theories, which in turn led to the famous 
Bell’s theorem.  Bohm had already in his 1951 textbook for-
mulated the EPR thought experiment in a form that could be 
tested experimentally.  Bell’s work gave new impetus to these 
type of experiments, and as is well know, the results of the 
experiments are consistent with quantum theory and thus 
also with Bohm’s theory (see Bricmont 2016).  It would have 
been very interesting to see Einstein’s reaction to Bell’s theo-
rem and the results of the experiments testing it. 
 Another puzzling feature of the Bohm theory is the space 
in which the new kind of quantum wave (mathematically 
described by the wave function psi) lives.  For a single parti-
cle it looks as if the wave lives in a 3-dimensional space (so 
that we can, for example, imagine the wave going through 
both slits in a two-slit experiment, which would satisfy Carte-
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sian demands of intelligibility).  However, it is characteristic 
of quantum theory that when two quantum objects interact 
they form an entangled state.  Such an entangled state is de-
scribed by a wave function that is a superposition of states.  
One cannot express such a wave function in a 3-dimensional 
space, but rather has to use a 3N-dimensional configuration 
space (where N is the number of particles; so that for 2 parti-
cles the space is 6-dimensional).  This means that the quan-
tum field in Bohm’s theory is different from, say, the 
electromagnetic field.  In Bohr’s Copenhagen interpretation 
one is not trying to give an ontological interpretation to the 
quantum wave function, but sees it as a part of a mathemati-
cal algorithm ones uses to calculate probabilities.  The multi-
dimensionality of the many-body wave-function is thus not a 
serious ontological puzzle. However, in an ontological ap-
proach such as Bohm’s one typically assumes that the quan-
tum wave describes an objectively existing, real field. But for 
a many-body system this field lives in a multi-dimensional 
configuration space, and it is difficult to understand what this 
could mean physically. Thus the crisis of intelligibility charac-
teristic of quantum phenomena thus persists even in the 
Bohm model. 
 Yet another feature of the theory that Bohm himself initial-
ly thought to be “strange and arbitrary” is the mathematical 
form of the quantum potential.  Classical potentials are pro-
portional to the size or amplitude of the fields that underlie 
them.  But the quantum potential depends only upon the 
form (second spatial derivative) of the quantum field. 
 Bohm himself suggested a way to resolve some of these 
difficulties only when he began to re-examine his 1952 model 
in the mid 1970s.  But as we will see, his new modifications 
imply the need to say farewell to traditional materialism.   
Bohm realized that the form-dependence of the quantum po-
tential might reveal an entirely new feature in fundamental 
physics.  In classical physics the effect of a wave upon a parti-
cle depends on the amplitude of the wave – the bigger the 
wave, the more energy it transmits, as our every-day experi-
ence with, say, water waves testifies.  But we are also familiar 
with situations where it is only the form of the wave that mat-
ters.  Think of a ship guided by a radar wave.  The radar 
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waves are not pushing and pulling the ship, but it is the form 
of the wave that in-forms the much greater energy of the 
ship.  Analogously, Bohm proposed that it is the form of the 
quantum wave that literally in-forms the energy of the parti-
cle.  Note that this is information for the electron, not infor-
mation for us (Bohm is thus assuming that information is an 
objective commodity that can guide processes in the objective 
world).  Also, if we assume that the quantum field is essen-
tially a field of information, this might help to make sense of 
the multidimensionality of the many-body wave function, for 
it is common to assume that information can be organized 
multi-dimensionally. 
Yet another feature of the Bohm theory is that the form of 
the quantum wave and thus the quantum potential reflects 
the form of the entire experimental environment, so that the 
particle can be influenced by distant features of the environ-
ment. We saw above that Niels Bohr used to emphasize the 
crucial role of the whole experimental context for the results 
of measurement, and Bohm’s new hypothesis makes such a 
role more intelligible. The Bohm theory also underlines the 
participatory nature of measurement at the quantum level.  
During the measurement, the observed system and the ob-
serving apparatus form an undivided whole, and measure-
ment typically does not reveal a property that a particle had 
prior to measurement. Such a participatory nature of the 
measurement differs radically from classical physics, where it 
is assumed that one is able to reduce the disturbance caused 
by the observing apparatus to the observed system without 
limit. 
Bohm also reflected upon the broader philosophical impli-
cations of his theory.  For one thing he felt that the introduc-
tion of objective and active information at the quantum level 
could alleviate the strict separation of mind and matter in 
Western science and philosophy.  If we allow that Bohmian 
quantum information can be seen as a primitive mind-like 
property of elementary particles, this might make features 
such as mental causation more intelligible (Bohm 1990; Hiley 
and Pylkkänen 2005; Pylkkänen 2007).  This is yet another 
way in which quantum theory might challenge the Cartesian 
philosophy, in this case undermining its strict dualism. 
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While von Wright had respect for the richness of Bohm’s 
knowledge and his creative phantasy, he also felt that Bohm’s 
philosophical attempts were clumsy (von Wright, 1986, 102n).  
However, he expressed to me in person that he was genuine-
ly interested in Bohm’s mind-matter theory and invited me to 
present a paper in his legendary research seminar in the 
spring of 1993 (Pylkkänen 1995).  When commenting on my 
paper “Mental causation and quantum ontology”, von 
Wright told the seminar participants that if Bohm’s proposal 
were correct it would be truly significant; he added, however, 
that he does not think it likely that it is correct.  
It is interesting to note that while Bohm’s theory was ini-
tially proposed as a materialistic picture of the physical 
world, the difficulties in the model prompted him later to 
modify this materialistic starting point, suggesting instead  - 
in a somewhat panpsychist vein - that information (under-
stood as a primitive mind-like quality) is a fundamental fea-
ture of elementary particles. This may be telling us something 
about the nature of quantum phenomena.  If we want to say 
something about quantum reality, at the very least we seem 
forced to give up classical mechanistic materialism.  Howev-
er, the nature of quantum reality is still a genuinely open 
question; and there are even those like Plotnitsky (2010: 9) 
who argue radically, in the spirit of Niels Bohr, that we can-
not even conceive of quantum objects beyond assuming that 
they exist.  This is an extension and radicalization of a Kanti-
an viewpoint. 
One should also note that a number of physicists think that 
Bohm’s theory can be interpreted without such exotic postu-
lates as “active information” (see Goldstein 2013, which also 
includes a discussion of various criticisms of the Bohm theo-
ry; see also Bricmont 2016).  This seems to be another case of 
the tension between intelligibility and mathematical precision 
that we saw already when considering Newtonian gravity in 
relation to Cartesian demands of intelligibility.  Bohm himself 
was seeking for an intelligible explanation and this led him to 
the exotic proposal of quantum theoretical active information; 
some other “Bohmians” find this unpalatable, and prefer to 
stick to the equations of “Bohmian mechanics”, without too 
The Crisis of Intelligibility   395 
 
much interpretative and metaphysical baggage (see also 
Pylkkänen, Hiley and Pättiniemi 2016).  
 
6. Conclusion: toward a new form of scientific 
rationality? 
We have seen that where the mechanistic world-view empha-
sizes the separation of subject and object, as well as atomism 
and determinism, quantum theory typically characterizes the 
relation of observing apparatus and object as mutual partici-
pation; emphasizes that the behavior of a system cannot be 
understood merely in terms of its parts and their relation-
ships; and holds that individual quantum processes are typi-
cally incontrollable and unpredictable, even if a kind of 
statistical causality prevails.  It seems clear that the mechanis-
tic world-view is limited, but there does not yet exist a com-
monly accepted coherent new world-view that could replace 
it (for a recent “structuralist realist” attempt, see Ladyman 
and Ross 2007). 
In Science and reason von Wright draws attention to the 
new holistic ways of thinking in physics. He also notes how 
many physicists have seen analogies between features of 
quantum theory and traditional myths and religions, regard-
ing the existence of a mind in nature, as well non-
deterministic and non-mechanical relationships. He com-
ments as follows: 
One must remain critical toward such speculations. They are 
neither “physics” nor “philosophy” in a strict sense. If they were 
merely an expression for conceptual confusion, they would not 
be … interesting. But they are also an expression for a so far dif-
fuse search after new basic models for scientific understanding. 
Thinking is freeing itself from the meristic and reifying view of 
nature and is moving toward a holistic approach, in which the 
gap between the object and the subject no longer splits reality 
into two essentially separate parts. (von Wright 1986, 100). 
As we mentioned in the introduction, von Wright thought 
that this search might even play a role in resolving the crisis 
of reason: 
The world-view that is slowly emerging will perhaps turn out to 
less devoted to legitimizing science as a productive factor in the 
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industrial process. The scientific search for truth may again be 
valued for the orientation it provides for our striving toward a 
reasonable life style, and not only for the power it gives to direct 
and manipulate the natural conditions. 
In the changes which the scientific world-view is undergoing – 
under the influence of [developments in physics and biology] – I 
have recognized a beginning of such a re-evaluation.  (von 
Wright 1986, 153). 
The question is whether science could again become a “ra-
tional search for the reasonable”, and in this way contribute 
better to solving the problems of our time, instead of making 
them worse.  Von Wright ends his book with characteristic 
pessimism and caution: 
I do not want to predict how these tendencies are going to de-
velop and which role they are going to play in history. I have no 
strong belief in the “triumph of reason”. But perhaps my atti-
tude can be called a commitment to reason as a hope for humani-
ty. (Ibid, 154). 
Von Wright’s speculations are bold – could it really be the 
case that a form of holistic scientific rationality that arises 
from modern physics and biology can help humanity to solve 
its many problems? Bohm, too, was concerned with the vari-
ous problems of humanity. He felt that a major problem is the 
tendency of human thought to fragment reality into inde-
pendent parts, somewhat in the spirit of the mechanistic 
world-view; and he also felt that the holistic developments in 
physics could help thought to transcend such fragmentary 
habits of thinking (Bohm 1980, ch1).  However, while von 
Wright’s approach was historical, Bohm (who initially was a 
Marxist dialectical materialist) came to emphasize the role of 
psychological and social factors. Inspired by many discus-
sions with the Indian thinker J. Krishnamurti he advocated 
the need for a “change of consciousness” (Bohm and Ed-
wards 1991). Later, he came to emphasize the importance of 
communication and dialogue, perhaps somewhat similar to 
Habermas’s approach (Bohm 1996; Kakkuri-Knuuttila 2015).    
Not only did Bohm theorize, he also actively initiated and 
engaged in various concrete large-group (30-40 participants) 
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dialogue experiments. The idea was that a new mode of 
large-group communication, collective intelligence and “im-
personal friendship” at the grass-roots level would spread 
throughout the society.   
We do not know which, if any, of these approaches will 
succeed in the long run.  But it is the great legacy of von 
Wright’s work that an important task of philosophy and sci-
ence is to reflect upon the deeper roots of the urgent prob-
lems facing our time. 
 
University of Helsinki and University of Skövde 
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